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AN END TO EMPTY DISTINCTIONS: FEE SHIFTING, THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, AND DOE
V BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS
MICHAEL GIUSEPPE CONGIJ*
INTRODUCTION
Under the "American Rule," absent an express statutory provision, the
prevailing litigant is ordinarily not permitted to collect reasonable attor-
neys' fees.1 Congress, however, in response to the judiciary's general in-
ability to award attorneys' fees to successful litigants, has enacted
numerous statutes authorizing the award of attorneys' fees to the "prevail-
ing party."2 The focus of this Comment is the definition of the phrase "pre-
vailing party" as it relates to the award of attorneys' fees under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act's ("IDEA") fee-shifting
provision.
The Supreme Court, in Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, concluded that a
party cannot "prevail" without provoking a judicially sanctioned alteration
in the legal relationship between the parties. 3 In dictum, the Buckhannon
Court indicated that a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent
decree suffices as a basis for awarding attorneys' fees. 4 In response, a ma-
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2006; B.A.,
Journalism, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2001. 1 owe huge debt of gratitude to Professor Martin
Malin and Professor Joan Steinman for their comments and insight. Special thanks to Thomas G. Sira-
cusa, Suzanne Law, Michelle Brunsvold, and Tonya Newman for their careful editing and comments. I
would also like to thank my family and friends. This Comment would not have been possible without
their love and support. Each summer, the Law Review invites students to participate in a closed-
research writing competition and then selects new members based on writing ability. The Chicago-Kent
Law Review selected this Comment as the Best Case Comment from the 2004 Summer Candidacy
Competition.
I. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). For more informa-
tion on the American Rule, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A
Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651.
2. AlyeskaPipelineServ. Co.,421 U.S. at 260.
3. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,
604 (2001) (noting that Congress intended an interlocutory award to a party only when the party estab-
lished entitlement to the relief through the merits of its claim).
4. Id. (noting that a consent decree, judgment on the merits, and the award of nominal damages
all have been held by the Supreme Court to be bases for attorneys' fees).
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jority of the federal courts of appeals applying Buckhannon have held that a
party prevails only when it obtains a judgment on the merits or court-
ordered consent decree.
In Doe v. Boston Public Schools, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed whether the Supreme Court's Buckhannon decision applied to
the IDEA's fee-shifting provision. 5 Relying heavily on other circuits' inter-
pretations of the IDEA,6 the Doe court reasoned that Buckhannon's inter-
pretation of "prevailing party" applied to the IDEA.7 Accordingly, the Doe
court held that because the plaintiff achieved her desired result through a
private settlement lacking judicial imprimatur, she was not entitled to at-
torneys' fees as a prevailing party.
8
Part I of this Comment will detail the relevant judicial and legislative
history necessary to provide the analytical framework to discuss the Doe
decision. Part II gives an overview of the IDEA. Part III presents the facts
of Doe and the First Circuit's reasoning. Part IV discusses why Doe was
incorrectly decided and, moreover, why the Supreme Court should overturn
Doe and endorse private settlement as a means of obtaining prevailing
party status under the IDEA. This conclusion is grounded in the text of the
IDEA, which, by limiting counsel fees based on the rejection of a previous
settlement offer, indicates that a settling plaintiff should be considered a
prevailing party. 9 This conclusion is also founded in the legislative history
of the IDEA, which clearly demonstrates that Congress intended to award
attorneys' fees to parties absent some form of court-ordered relief. 10
Although the Buckhannon decision may be criticized, and the virtues
of the "catalyst theory" argued, this Comment focuses instead on the Doe
court's overly formalistic and misguided analysis. The Buckhannon Court
decided that plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys' fees when they obtain
their sought-after relief through legislative change or a unilateral alteration
of the defendant's conduct. The Buckhannon Court premised its reasoning
almost exclusively on whether the catalyst theory, and not private settle-
5. Doe v. Boston Pub. Schs., 358 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 2004). The fec-shifting provision of the
IDEA states: "In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may
award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of the child with a disability who is
the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000).
6. Doe, 358 F.3d at 25.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 30 (holding that "plaintiffs who achieve their desired result via private settlement may
not, in the absence ofjudicial imprimatur, be considered 'prevailing parties').
9. See infra note 97.
10. Seeinfranote28.
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ment, could justifiably authorize courts to assess fee awards. 1 As such, and
given that private settlement is free from the practical and definitional dif-
ficulties of the catalyst theory, the distinction between private settlements
and consent decrees relied upon by Doe is meaningless when viewed
within the context of the IDEA.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FEE SHIFTING IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States is part of a small minority of industrialized democ-
racies that do not routinely require losing litigants to pay their adversaries'
attorneys' fees. 12 Since 1796, the Supreme Court has refused to create a
general rule independent of statutory authorization allowing the award of
attorneys' fees to a prevailing litigant.13
However, American courts have routinely exercised their equitable
powers absent statutory authority to assess attorneys' fees when a losing
party has willfully disobeyed a court order, or when successful litigants
have created a common fund for recovery or extended a substantial benefit
to a class. 14 In the early 1970s, the federal judiciary attempted to create
another, more pervasive exception to the "American Rule" by awarding
attorneys' fees to parties acting as "private attorneys general."'15 Under the
"private attorney general" rationale, courts acknowledged that the Ameri-
can Rule significantly diminished private parties' incentive to bring so-
cially desirable litigation. 16 To encourage such litigation, courts began to
award attorneys' fees to parties advancing actions that furthered substantial
and concrete public interests. 
17
The Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilder-
ness Society responded to this trend by admonishing federal courts against
fashioning this exception to the long-standing American Rule.' 8 In Alyeska,
the appellate court had awarded attorneys' fees to the respondent environ-
11. Buekhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Heath & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598
(2001).
12. See generally Rowe, supra note 1, at 651.
13. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 249 (1975).
14. Id. at 257-59.
15. Id. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote that under the "private attorney
general" theory, a party is entitled to counsel fees when:
(1) the important right being protected is one actually or necessarily shared by the general
public or some class thereof; (2) the plaintiff's pecuniary interest in the outcome, if any,
would not normally justify incurring the cost of counsel; and (3) shifting that cost to the de-
fendant would effectively place it on a class that benefits from the litigation.
Id. For more information on the private attorney general theory, see Rowe, supra note 1, at 662-63.
16. See Rowe, supra note 1, at 662-63.
17. Id.
18. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 269.
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mental groups after their action to prevent the issuance of permits to build a
trans-Alaskan pipeline prompted Congress to amend the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920.19 Although the legislative change embodied the relief sought
by the respondents, 20 it also effectively mooted the substantive issues of
their suit, thus leaving the Supreme Court to evaluate the award of attor-
neys' fees.21 The Court acknowledged Congress' historical power to set
fee-shifting policy 22 as well as the narrow set of circumstances 23 in which
the judiciary has been empowered to award attorneys' fees. Ultimately, the
Alyeska Court rejected the private attorney general theory, reasoning that,
without explicit legislative guidance, the federal judiciary should not redis-
tribute the costs of litigation in such a manner.
24
Responding to the Alyeska decision, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act (the "Act"). 25 The Act's explicit purpose was
to empower courts to allocate reasonable counsel fees to parties prevailing
in litigation brought to enforce private civil rights.26 Congress reasoned that
the right to counsel fees was essential to preserve meaningful opportunities
for all citizens to vindicate their civil rights.27 To ensure those rights, the
Senate expressly acknowledged that a party may "prevail," for the purpose
of obtaining counsel fees, without formally attaining relief.
28
19. Id. at243, 245.
20. Id. at 285 (Marshall, J:, dissenting) (noting that Respondents' litigation forced Congress to
revise the Mineral Leasing Act thus forcing the petitioners to pay their fair share for a pipeline right-of-
way).
21. Id. at 245.
22. Id. at 271.
23. Id. at 257-59.
24. Id. at 271. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, argued that the majority erred by failing to recog-
nize the equitable power of the judiciary to award attorneys' fees "when the interests of justice so
require." Justice Marshall opined that "precedent" and "policy" both suggest the conclusion that the
award of attorneys' fees is not a matter of pure statutory interpretation, but rather has an independent
basis in the judiciary's power. Id. at 272-75.
25. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000)).
26. S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at I (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908.
27. Id. ("The purpose of this amendment is to remedy the anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws
created by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wil-
derness Society.").
28. Id. at 5; see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908.
The House Report corroborated the Senate Report to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act by
stating:
The phrase "prevailing party" is not intended to be limited to the victor only after entry of a
final judgment following a full trial on the merits.... A "prevailing" party should not be pe-
nalized for seeking an out-of-court settlement, thus helping to lessen docket congestion. Simi-
larly, after a complaint is filed, a defendant might voluntarily cease the unlawful practice. A
court should still award fees even though it might conclude, as a matter of equity, that no
formal relief, such as an injunction, is needed.
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Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources presented the Court with a situation analo-
gous to Alyeska. The plaintiffs in Buckhannon sought attorneys' fees after
their pending lawsuit prompted the West Virginia legislature to repeal a
statute that violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.29 As in Alyeska, a legislative
change mooted the plaintiffs' action.30 However, unlike Alyeska, the plain-
tiffs in Buckhannon sued under statutes that authorized courts to award
reasonable attorneys' fees to a prevailing party.3 1 The plaintiffs argued that
they were prevailing parties because the West Virginia legislature's action
embodied the ultimate objective of their lawsuit.
32
The Court disagreed and rejected the so-called "catalyst theory,"
33
holding that prevailing party status requires some measure of court-ordered
relief.34 Echoing the limits of judicial authority to award counsel fees es-
poused in Alyeska,35 the Buckhannon Court held that a party cannot prevail
without a judicially sanctioned, "material alteration of the legal relationship
of the parties. '36 The Court reasoned that some merits-based judicial decree
was necessary to avoid the award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs bringing
meritless actions. 37 Additionally, the Court was concerned that a fee award
under the catalyst theory would result in satellite litigation requiring the
subjective analysis of a defendant's motives for altering its conduct. 38 In
dictum, the majority indicated that judgments on the merits or private set-
tlements enforceable through consent decree were examples of sufficient
judicial imprimatur.
39
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg denounced the majority's failure to
acknowledge the substantial body of precedent supporting the notion that a





33. Id. at 610 (noting the three factors of the catalyst rule include: (I) the defendant must have
provided some of the benefit sought in bringing the lawsuit, (2) the plaintiff must have stated a genuine,
nonfrivolous claim, and (3) the suit must have been a substantial or significant cause of defendant's
action to provide the relief).
34. Id. at 604. Justice Scalia argued in his concurrence that the concept of "prevailing," as con-
firmed by many statutes using the term "presumes the existence ofa judicial ruling." Id. at 614.
35. Id- at 610 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975),
for the proposition that Congress had not "extended any roving authority" to the judiciary to award
counsel fees whenever the court deems them warranted).
36. Id. at 604.
37. Id. at 606.
38. Id. at 609.
39. Id. at604.
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party may prevail, within the well-established meaning of the phrase, 40
absent a final judgment or consent decree. 4 1 Justice Ginsburg reasoned that
a party that obtains the ultimate objective of its lawsuit still prevails even in
the absence of judicial imprimatur.42 The dissent further criticized the ma-
jority's strict construction of the phrase "prevailing party," noting that the
majority's view contravened the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act's express purpose of providing individuals with an incentive to bring
actions enforcing their civil rights.
43
Five months after Buckhannon, the Second Circuit interpreted the fee-
shifting provision of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act in New
York State Federation of Taxi Drivers v. Westchester County Taxi and
Limousine Commission.44 Following Buckhannon's reasoning, the Taxi
Drivers court held that a private reciprocity agreement 45 mooting pending
litigation could not be considered a judicially sanctioned alteration in the
legal relationship between the parties.46 Although the case was brought to
vindicate the civil rights of the plaintiff trade organization, 47 the Second
Circuit held that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorneys' fees as a prevail-
ing party.48
Since the Taxi Drivers decision, the majority view has been that
Buckhannon applies expansively to virtually all free-shifting statutes.
49
40. Id. at 625-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that "[p]rior to 1994, every Federal Court of
Appeals (except the Federal Circuit, which had not addressed the issue)" awarded attorneys' fees to
plaintiffs who acted as "catalysts" for the desired change they sought).
41. Id. at 634.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 622-23 (reasoning that the majority's rejection of the catalyst theory will "impede
access to the court for the less well heeled, and shrink the incentive Congress created for the enforce-
ment of federal law by private attorneys general").
44. N.Y. St. Fed. of Taxi Drivers v. Westchester County Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 272 F.3d
154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2001).
45. The reciprocity agreement reached between for-hire drivers in Westchester County and New
York City allowed for each party to recognize for-hire licenses granted by the other. Id. at 156.
46. Id. at 158-59.
47. Plaintiff trade organization sought declaratory and permanent injunctive relief alleging that
For-Hire Vehicle Law was unconstitutionally vague under the Federal and New York Constitutions,
that the enforcement of the law was arbitrary and capricious, that the law was an undue burden on the
Federation members' right to travel, and that the Federation members were being stopped and searched
in violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at
156-57.
48. Id. at 159.
49. See Doe v. Boston Pub. Schs., 358 F.3d 20, 24-25 (1st. Cir. 2004); Christina A. v. Bloomberg,
315 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a private settlement did not entitle plaintiffs to attor-
neys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, AFL-CIO,
CLC v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 336 F.3d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that Buck-
hannon applied to claims brought by union under the Freedom of Information Act although the fee-
shifting provision of the Act used the language "substantially prevailed").
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Notably, the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits all hold that the fee-
shifting provision of the IDEA, which also authorizes the award of attor-
neys' fees to the prevailing party, falls within the ambit of Buckhannon's
interpretation of "prevailing party."5 0
With respect to private settlement, several courts have rejected the
rigid view that a party must obtain at minimum a consent decree to merit
prevailing party status. 51 As set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Barrios v.
California Interscholastic Federation, this minority interpretation reasons
that the Supreme Court's limitation on prevailing party status to plaintiffs
who obtain judgments or consent decrees was merely dictum.5 2 However,
this interpretation would not have any practical effect on settling plaintiffs
like Jane Doe.
To illustrate, in Barrios, a paraplegic baseball coach was excluded
from on-field coaching because his specially designed athletic wheelchair
allegedly disrupted play.53 The Coach subsequently sued the interscholastic
athletic association under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and
the parties ultimately entered into a settlement agreement. 54 The Barrios
court held that the plaintiff's private settlement did not preclude his "pre-
vailing" for the purpose of attorneys' fees. 55 Instead, the court reasoned
that a settling party may "prevail" when it obtains the primary benefit
sought in bringing the suit. 56 However, the plaintiff in Barrios "prevailed"
because the terms of his settlement were enforceable by virtue of their be-
ing incorporated into a court order. Thus, Barrios does not stand for the
proposition that a party may prevail without some form of judicial impri-
matur.- Although language from Barrios may suggest that conclusion, the
case, and the approach that it espouses, differs because the court refused to
rely on a final judgment or consent decree as the only means of relief suffi-
50. John T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that
the fee-shifting provision of the IDEA was subject to Buckhannon); T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist., No.
102, 349 F.3d 469, 474, 478-80 (7th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that although the case was privately settled,
because the IDEA allows the award of attorneys' fees to parties who "prevail" in any action or adminis-
trative proceeding, and because the plaintiff was awarded reimbursement of the cost of attending a
private school at an IDEA due process hearing, the plaintiff was a "prevailing party"); J.C. v. Reg') Sch.
Dist. 10, Bd. of Educ., 278 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that Buckhannon applied to a disabled
child's claims under the IDEA).
51. See Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 82 n.7 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that only the Eighth Circuit has
adopted the narrow view that a party prevails only when it obtains a judgment of the merits or court-
ordered consent decree); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2002).
52. Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134 n.5.
53. Id.atll3l.
54. Id. at 1133.
55. Id. at 1137.
56. Id.
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
cient to warrant prevailing party status.57 As such, this interpretation would
not benefit settling IDEA plaintiffs like Jane Doe who do not have any
aspect of their agreement sanctioned by a judge or hearing officer.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE IDEA
Originally enacted as the Education of the Handicapped Act of 1975,58
the IDEA was drafted by Congress to ensure that all disabled children re-
ceive a "free appropriate public education."' 59 In light of that purpose, the
IDEA was drafted to provide state and local agencies with the framework
in which to provide appropriate placement to students with special needs.
60
Under the IDEA, schools are required to provide parents the opportu-
nity to present complaints "with respect to any matter relating to the identi-
fication, evaluation or educational placement of their child. '61 If the parent
is not satisfied with the manner in which his complaint has been resolved,
the parent also has the right to a mediation or impartial due process hear-
ing.62 Furthermore, if the placement dispute is not resolved at this prelimi-
nary stage, a parent is then permitted to commence a civil action in state or
federal court. 63 Significantly, a parent is entitled to be represented by coun-
sel throughout all phases of IDEA administrative hearings.64 To alleviate
the financial burden on parents throughout this process, the IDEA contains
a fee-shifting provision that awards attorneys' fees to the "prevailing
party."
65
In addition to providing the framework for resolving educational
placement disputes, the IDEA encourages, through the incentive of attor-
neys' fees, the prompt resolution of such disputes. For example, the statute
precludes a fee award where the parent has unreasonably protracted the
dispute.66 Further, the IDEA provides that the student must remain in the
current educational setting during the pendency of IDEA administrative
57. Id. at 1134 n.5. The Barrios court also distinguished Buckhannon on the basis that the plain-
tiff's lawsuit resulted in an enforceable instrument against the defendant rather than a legislative or
policy change. Id-
58 Education of the Handicapped Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175.
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2000).
60. § 1400(d)(2).
61. § 1415(b)(6).
62. §§ 1415(e)(1), 1415(f)(1).
63. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
64. § 1415(h)(1).
65. The fee-shifting provision of the IDEA states: "In any action or proceeding brought under this
section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the
parents of the child with a disability who is the prevailing party." § 1415(i)(3)(B).
66. § 1415(i)(3)(F)(i).
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hearings unless a move is otherwise agreed upon by parents and school
personnel. 67 Although this Comment focuses on fee awards to the parents
of special-needs children, the language and purpose of the IDEA centers
squarely on the educational interests of the child whose placement is in
dispute. The statute seeks to provide appropriate placement as quickly as
possible while minimizing the disruption caused by placement disputes.
III. DOE V. BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. Facts
At the time of suit, plaintiff Jane Doe ("Jane") was a nineteen year-old
Boston resident suffering from a severe mental disability. 68 Pursuant to the
IDEA, Jane was entitled to special educational services and defendant City
of Boston Public Schools ("Boston") was obligated to prepare an Individu-
alized Education Program ("IEP") to ensure her appropriate placement.
69
Initially, Jane attended a public vocational school in Boston.70 Her fa-
ther subsequently requested that she be placed in a private residential
school. 7 1 Pursuant to IDEA protocol, the parties met to discuss Jane's fa-
ther's request. 72 Boston rejected his request and subsequently offered Jane
additional educational services at the public school she already attended as
well residential services at a state mental health facility.
73
After Jane's father rejected the proposal, the two parties unsuccess-
fully attempted to mediate their dispute before the Bureau of Special Edu-
cation Appeals ("BSEA").74 On July 22, 2002, Jane's father filed for a
BSEA hearing, requesting placement at a small, therapeutic day school.
75
Just prior to the BSEA hearing on October 9, 2002, Boston presented
Jane's father with an IEP that included placement in a private therapeutic
day school program. 76 Jane's father accepted the IEP and requested that the
placement be read into the record and signed by a BSEA hearing officer.
77
The hearing officer denied the request, stating that it was "against his usual
67. § 14150).
68. Doe v. Boston Pub. Schs., 358 F.3d 20, 21 (1 st Cir. 2004).
69. Id. at 21-22.
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practice. '78 After the hearing, Jane's father filed an unsuccessful motion to
establish Jane's placement as a final judgment and to direct the BSEA to
implement her IEP.
79
On March 4, 2003, Jane filed a complaint in district court seeking at-
torneys' fees. 80 The district court granted Boston's motion to dismiss the
complaint, finding that Jane was not a prevailing party under Buckhannon
because she did not achieve a merit-based final judgment or a court-ordered
consent decree.
81
B. The First Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
Thus, the issue before the Doe court was whether Buckhannon's inter-
pretation of "prevailing party" applied to the IDEA's fee-shifting provi-
sion.82 As a case of first impression, the court began by addressing the
statutory history of the IDEA, as well as the expansive application of Buck-
hannon to virtually all fee-shifting statutes. 83 The Doe court rejected the
Barrios court's interpretation, noting Buckhannon's express view that pri-
vate settlement lacked the judicial oversight necessary to warrant prevailing
party status.84 The Doe court also recognized that each federal court of
appeals to consider Buckhannon's application to the IDEA had held that
privately settling plaintiffs should not be considered prevailing parties.
85
Accordingly, the Doe court held that Buckhannon presumptively applied to
the IDEA unless the statutory text, structure, or legislative history of the
statute indicated the contrary.
86
With this analytical framework in place, the court first evaluated
whether the language or structure of the IDEA suggested that the phrase
"prevailing party" was intended to include settlement-based fee awards.
87
The court reasoned that the IDEA's complexity and comprehensive nature
were not enough to place it beyond the ambit of Buckhannon.88 Addition-






83. Doe, 358 F.3d at 22-25. The First Circuit began their analysis by characterizing Jane's IEP
placement as a private settlement. id. at 22-23 n,l,
84. Id. at 25.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 25-26.
87. Id. at 26-27.
88. Id.
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the provision that limited the recovery of attorneys' fees for services per-
formed subsequent to "a written offer of settlement," did not broaden the
meaning of "prevail" under the IDEA to include settlement because the
limiting provisions became relevant "only after a plaintiff has been deemed
a prevailing party."
89
Second, the court assessed whether the IDEA's legislative history
placed it beyond the scope of Buckhannon. The court found that the legisla-
tive history indicated that Congress intended courts to interpret the IDEA's
fee-shifting provision in harmony with Supreme Court decisions interpret-
ing the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.90 Although conceding
that the evidence provided by plaintiff and amicus curiae suggested that
Congress intended to define "prevailing party" to include private settle-
ment, the Doe court held that the IDEA's legislative history did not indicate
the convincing intent necessary to overcome the strong presumption of
Buckhannon 's applicability. 9 1
Finally, Jane leveled two policy arguments. Jane first argued that rec-
ognizing private settlement as a means of prevailing under the IDEA fur-
thered the IDEA's purpose to encourage the prompt resolution of disputes
regarding a handicapped child's educational placement.92 Second, Jane
argued that precluding the award of attorneys' fees incurred to achieve
proper educational placement violated the IDEA's guarantee of a "free
appropriate public education." 93 The Doe court quickly dismissed Jane's
policy arguments reasoning that in light of Buckhannon and Alyeska, such
concerns were within the exclusive province of Congress.9 4
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD OVERTURN DOE AND ENDORSE
PRIVATE SETTLEMENT AS A MEANS OF OBTAINING PREVAILING PARTY
STATUS UNDER THE IDEA.
Doe was incorrectly decided. Specifically, the Doe court incorrectly
interpreted the legislative text and history of the IDEA. The court failed to
acknowledge that distinguishing consent decrees from private IDEA set-
tlements constitutes a meaningless distinction that works against the well
established purpose of the IDEA. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should
89. Id.
90. Id. at 27.
91. Id. at 28.




overturn Doe and endorse private settlement as a means of obtaining pre-
vailing party status under the IDEA.
First, the Doe court incorrectly interpreted the legislative text of the
IDEA. The IDEA contains several provisions that limit the amount of at-
torneys' fees to which a plaintiff is entitled based on the nature and rejec-
tion of a previous settlement offer.95 The court reasoned that these IDEA
provisions limiting the recovery of attorneys' fees for services performed
subsequent to "a written offer of settlement" are not relevant because they
apply only after a plaintiff had been deemed a prevailing party.96
However, the court failed to consider that because the IDEA limits fee
awards based on the rejection of a previous settlement offer,97 the statute
indicates that a settling plaintiff should be considered a prevailing party. In
other words, under the IDEA, a party must achieve prevailing party status
in order to obtain counsel fees. However, by refusing to award attorneys'
fees to "prevailing" plaintiffs who have rejected settlement offers, the lan-
guage of the statute places an equal if not greater significance on settlement
as opposed to final judgments or other, more established forms of imprima-
tur. As will be discussed further below, the premium given to the resolution
of IDEA disputes through settlement is consistent with the statute's pur-
pose of ensuring the prompt resolution of such disputes. Moreover, award-
ing attorneys' fees to settling plaintiffs honors the statute's language
indicating settlement's integral role in IDEA proceedings. As such, it is of
no consequence that the aforesaid provisions may speak to circumstances
after a party has been deemed "prevailing" because the clear import of the
statute's language indicates that settling parents are prevailing plaintiffs
that should be awarded attorneys' fees.
The Doe court also failed to fully consider that the IDEA expressly
proscribes the award of attorneys' fees to any parent who ultimately obtains
relief through an administrative hearing or court proceeding that is less
95. See infra note 97,
96. Doe, 358 F.3d at 26-27.
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) (2000). The IDEA provides:
Attorneys' fees may not be awarded and related costs may not be reimbursed in any ac-
tion or proceeding under this section for services performed subsequent to the time of written
offer of settlement to a parent if-
(1) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, at any time more than 10 days be-
fore the proceeding begins;
(1I) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and
(Ill) the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally obtained by
the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement.
Id.; see also § 1415(i)(3)(E) ("Notwithstanding subparagraph (D), [i.e. all provisions regarding the
prohibition of attorneys' fees], an award of attorneys' fees and related costs may be made to a parent
who is the prevailing parent and who was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer.").
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favorable than a previous offer of settlement. 98 By prohibiting a fee award
in excess of the costs incurred prior to a settlement offer to a parent who
ultimately prevails in this manner, the IDEA encourages settlement, thus
effectuating the statute's well-established purpose of ensuring the prompt
resolution of disputes concerning the educational placement of handi-
capped children.99 As stated previously, in addition to the provision aimed
at ensuring the prompt resolution of disputes, the IDEA also contains a
"stay-put provision" 100 to limit the disruption created by such disputes.
Again, this stay-put provision requires that a child remain in their current
educational placement throughout the duration of an IDEA hearing.101
As a whole, the unambiguous purpose of the IDEA is to provide a free
and appropriate education to children with disabilities. 10 2 The purpose of
providing free appropriate education demands the handling of disputes
regarding such placement in a timely manner free of unnecessary disrup-
tion.103 Thus, given the statutory text clearly intending to effectuate these
aims and the fact that allowing settling parents to recover attorneys' fees
facilitates those aims, the Doe court erred in holding that the text of the
IDEA did not place it beyond the scope of Buckhannon.
Second, the Doe court incorrectly interpreted the legislative history of
the IDEA. The court recognized that the legislative history indicated that
courts should interpret its fee-shifting provision in harmony with the Civil
98. See § 1415(i)(3)(E).
99. See Blackman v. District of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 2d 71, 80 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that a
school board's denial of a timely due process hearing constitutes a denial of a free appropriate educa-
tion); Rapid City Sch. Dist. 51/4 v. Vahle, 922 F.2d 476, 478 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that under the
IDEA, parents who unilaterally place their children in a private school may be reimbursed for the costs
thereof if the school district fails to conduct a timely due process hearing and such unilateral placement
is deemed to be appropriate); Spiegler v. District of Columbia, 866 F.2d 461, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(holding that the underlying purpose of the IDEA is "to ensure the prompt resolution of disputes regard-
ing appropriate education of handicapped children").
100. § 1415(j) ("[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section,
unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in
the then-current educational placement of such child").
101. Id.
102. § 1400(d)(l)(A) ("The purposes of this chapter are-to ensure that all children with disabili-
ties have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent
living.").
103. See Spiegler, 866 F.2d at 467 (citing 121 Cong- Rec- 37,416 (1975)). Senator Williams stated:
I cannot emphasize enough that delay in resolving matters regarding the education program of
a handicapped child is extremely detrimental to his development. The interruption or lack of
the required special education and related services can result in a substantial setback to the
child's development. Thus, in view of the urgent need for prompt resolution of questions in-
volving the education of handicapped children it is expected that all hearings and reviews
conducted pursuant to these provisions will be commenced and disposed of as quickly as
practicable consistent with a fair consideration of the issues involved.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act and Supreme Court interpretations
thereof.104 Added in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Aly-
eska,105 the legislative history of the Act clearly reflects Congress' intent to
authorize fee awards to parties vindicating their civil rights without obtain-
ing some measure of court-ordered relief.t06 For example, the House Re-
port accompanying the Act states that a party "should not be penalized for
seeking an out-of-court settlement," and the Senate Report accompanying
the Act indicates that a party may be awarded counsel fees absent some
form ofjudicial relief.107 Further, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Act unequivocally indicates that a party prevailing under a fee-shifting
statute ordinarily should be awarded attorneys' fees "unless special circum-
stances make such an award unjust."'os For example, the Court in Hensley
v. Eckerhart reasoned that although the plaintiff prevailed through private
settlement rather than litigation, such a resolution did not weaken her claim
to attorneys' fees under the Act. 109 Thus, it is clear that judicial imprimatur
was not a necessary component to the awarding of attorneys' fees as con-
templated by the Act and its subsequent interpretations.
However, it is still unclear what form of nonjudicial relief would jus-
tify a fee award. Although Buckhannon closed the door on the catalyst
theory, it did not foreclose the possibility of a settlement-based fee
award.' 10 Presumably, the Doe court refused to construe the IDEA's legis-
lative history to evidence the authorization of settlement-based fee awards
because the Buckhannon Court asserted that no measure of legislative his-
tory could overcome the "clear meaning of 'prevailing party."11
104. Doe v. Boston Pub. Schs., 358 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that Congressional history
indicates an intent that the IDEA be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act and other fee-shifting statutes, and not be considered sui generis).
105. S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908.
106. Id. at 5; see also H.R. Rep. 94-1558, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908.
107. Id.
108. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).
109. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429.
110. In a footnote, the Court distinguished consent decrees-a form of imprimatur endorsed by the
Court as a means of obtaining counsel fees-from private settlement on the sole basis that consent
decrees ensured federal jurisdiction to enforce private contractual settlement. Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc., v. W. Va. Dep't Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 n.7 (2001).
111. Although the meaning of the phrase "prevailing party" may have been clear to the Buckhan-
non majority, Justice Ginsburg's dissent and the subsequent circuit split regarding the meaning of the
phrase is sufficient indication that the phrase's meaning is not conclusive enough to dismiss, as the
Buckhannon majority did, clear indicia of legislative history that "prevailing party" may include some
forms of nonjudicial relief. Id. at 607.
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However, the Buckhannon Court premised its analysis almost com-
pletely on the availability of the catalyst theory. 112 The Court did not ad-
dress whether the IDEA's legislative history indicated whether a party can
prevail through private settlement. This is significant because the practical
and definitional difficulties associated with the catalyst theory do not attach
to private settlement in the manner contemplated by the Buckhannon
Court.1 13 As a definitional matter, private settlement is a much more unam-
biguous means of prevailing than that recognized by the catalyst theory-
namely, a favorable alteration in the defendant's conduct brought about by
litigation. Moreover, as a practical matter, a private settlement agreement
does not require additional litigation to discover the underlying motivation
behind a defendant's changed conduct.
1 14
In other words, it is a much closer question as to whether a party "pre-
vails" through private settlement than whether a favorable alteration in the
defendant's conduct manifests a "prevailing party." Indeed, the Second
Circuit has recognized the qualitative difference between settlement
agreements and resolutions that were a result of the catalyst theory."
I5
Thus, the Buckhannon Court's analysis of legislative history, which was
premised on the availability of the catalyst theory, was largely inapposite to
the Doe case. Further, a significant amount of IDEA legislative history
suggests that a privately settling plaintiff may recover attorneys' fees."
l6
For example, the IDEA's legislative history unambiguously establishes that
the IDEA was meant to allow parents meaningful opportunities to take part
in the educational placement of their children and that the handling of dis-
putes regarding such placement be prompt. 117 Providing an award of attor-
neys' fees to a privately settling plaintiff is a clear manifestation of this
congressional purpose in a manner free of the definitional and practical
difficulties inherent to the catalyst theory that troubled the Buckhannon
Court.
Additionally, two issues further indicate that private settlement is a
proper basis for an attorneys' fees award under the IDEA. First, the Doe
112. See generally id.
113. Id. at 609.
114. Id.
115. Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 2003).
116. Id- at 637-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that both the Senate and House reports on the
1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act and subsequent judicial interpretations thereof clearly
demonstrate a congressional intent to award attorneys' fees absent court-ordered relief). Curiously, the
Doe court failed to directly address these reports and concentrated instead on rebuking other, less
germane pieces of legislative history utilized by the Plaintiff and amicus curiae. Doe v. Boston Pub.
Schs., 358 F.3d 20, 27-28 (1st Cir, 2004).
117. See supra note 103.
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court relied on dictum from Buckhannon to reason that private settlement
cannot create prevailing party status because it lacks the federal judicial
oversight necessary to grant federal courts jurisdiction to enforce such set-
tlement agreements.] 18 Initially, it must be noted that federal power to en-
force settlement agreements has little if anything to do with the
authorization to award attorneys' fees. That notwithstanding, even if fed-
eral jurisdiction regarding such matters were foreclosed, the federal judici-
ary's interest in hearing such disputes cannot outweigh the IDEA's
underlying purpose to provide parents with reasonable opportunities to seek
the prompt resolutions of such disputes. This is especially true considering
that state law, and not the broad, general guidelines provided by the IDEA,
will likely govern these disputes.1 19 As such, state courts will have greater
familiarity with the idiosyncrasies of their own law and thus be better
equipped to hear disputes arising under state law than federal courts.
Second, the BSEA hearing officer's refusal to read the placement into
the record or affirm the placement as a final judgment illustrates the inher-
ent emptiness of the technical distinctions that a reliance on judicial impri-
matur necessitates in the context of IDEA proceedings. In Doe, the simple
act of failing to include a settlement agreement into the record precluded an
attorneys' fee award.
Similarly, in J C. v. Regional School District 10, Board of Education,
an IDEA administrative board also declined to read an agreed-upon educa-
tional placement into the record, fearing that doing so would expose the
board to liability for attorneys' fees. 120 In Doe, had the hearing officer read
the agreed-upon IEP into the record, such an action would have been suffi-
cient to establish judicial imprimatur. Furthermore, Jane sought the very
same judicial oversight that would have converted her settlement into a
consent decree by filing a motion seeking the BSEA to direct implementa-
tion of the IEP. It should be beyond dispute that parental reliance on re-
couping attorneys' fees effectively preserves the right to bring actions in
vindication of civil rights under the IDEA. As such, the fine distinction
between judicially sanctioned settlement and private settlement ceases to be
principled 12' when the power to create judicial oversight has the potential
118. Doe, 358 F.3d at 25.
119. The IDEA empowers "la]ny State educational agency, State agency, or local educational
agency" to establish and maintain procedures in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the statute's
section regarding procedural safeguards. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (2000).
120. J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, Bd. of Educ., 278 F.3d 119; 122 (2d Cir. 2002).
121. See Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501, 519 (1986) (holding that a consent decree, depending on the circumstances, can be character-
ized as a judicial order or a private contractual agreement); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 281 (4th
Cir. 2002) (distinguishing consent decrees from private settlements by reasoning that private settle-
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to be wielded in such an arbitrary manner. To reason otherwise supplants
the substance and underlying policy of the IDEA with a meaningless
distinction.
CONCLUSION
Using the very same analytical framework employed by Doe, the
foregoing illustrates that the IDEA's legislative history and text overcomes
the presumption of Buckhannon's applicability in this context. In its most
generic form, the Buckhannon holding requires that some measure of court-
ordered relief create a "material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties" to justify an attorneys' fee award. 122 However, the Buckhannon
holding should not be analyzed in a vacuum. To do so gives undue breadth
to a judicial decision without properly employing the sources of legislative
guidance necessary to comply with the "American Rule." As stated in Aly-
eska, the judiciary has no "roving authority" to make fee-shifting determi-
nations without legislative assistance. 123 In Doe, the court improperly
interpreted the IDEA's legislative text and history to conclude that a pri-
vately settling plaintiff could not "prevail" for the purpose of awarding
attorneys' fees. Hence, although the Doe court did not ignore Congress, its
failure to properly effectuate Congressional purpose abrogated the text and
underlying policy of the IDEA. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should
revisit Doe and hold that private settlement is sufficient to warrant prevail-
ing party status under the IDEA because this conclusion evinces the text,
history, and purpose of the IDEA without being encumbered by the defini-
tional and practical difficulties of the catalyst theory.
ments are not entered as court orders, do not receive court approval, and are not subject to judicial
oversight attendant to the court's authority to enforce its orders).
122. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,
604 (2001).
123. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975).

